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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RIGHT TO WEAR
A TRADITIONAL INDIAN HAIR STYLE-
RECOGNITION OF A HERITAGE
Peggy Doty
In recent years there has been an increase in awareness of the Ameri-
can Indian's historical, cultural, and religious traditions. Not surpris-
ingly, attempts to revitalize these customs have often resulted in
litigation.1 One area in particular where this has occurred is in efforts
of Native American students and inmates of penal institutions to
claim cultural and religious rights to wear traditional Indian hair
styles in violation of institutional regulations.' There are arguments
for allowing such hair styles, even though to do so violates the appear-
ance codes of the regulated school or prison environment. Neverthe-
less, except in one case, Teterud v. Gillman,3 the courts so far have
been reluctant to recognize any rights in this particular area.4
Theories and Arguments
Related to Religion
The argument for wearing long hair as an exercise of religion, with
the right protected under first amendment freedom of religious
expression,r, most often stems from the view that the Indian's daily
secular activities are interrelated and integrated with his religious
beliefs.' This view of the interaction of daily activities and religion
is part of the heritage of many Indians7, as well as the particular
Indians already involved in litigation." There is, however, some differ-
ence of opinion on the importance and validity of this theory.'
Another religious argument with substance concerns the taking of
a "Ceremonial Indian Vow."'" This position emphasizes the serious-
ness and sincerity of the vow in conjunction with strong beliefs about
breaking such a solemn oath, and is only pertinent to the religious
right issue if the subject matter of the vow is of a religious nature.
Again, as in the first view, there is disagreement as to the importance
and effect of such a vow and the believed consequences for breaking
it." Other than these two grounds, there is apparently no other sub-
stantial religious basis for wearing long braided hair, 2 and even the
grounds espoused have not received much legal recognition.'
3
Another issue that has been raised in the Indian religion issue
involves the extent to which the first amendment applies to a tradi-
tional Native American religion, i.e., one that is fundamentally
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different from the Judeo-Christian religions the first amendment was
designed to protect. 14 On its face, this interrogatory indicates that a
Native American religion would be excluded from the intended
protection of the first amendment. This, however, would seem to be
unlikely considering the purpose behind constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of religion. The purpose was to protect such an exercise of
religion from being unreasonably controlled by the government,"
a situation in England that helped prompt the early settlement of
the United States by colonists rebelling against such religious restric-
tions. Thus, the motivation behind this constitutional guarantee
would indicate that perhaps the first amendment might be more
liberally extended to protect Native American religious beliefs.
Related to Culture
Another argument for the right to wear a traditional Indian hair
style centers upon the cultural significance of such a right. Although
each tribe or group of Indians should be considered individually,
generally, the traditional style of long, braided hair was a common
cultural characteristic among the many different Indian tribes.' 0
Although there is no legally recognized right to preserve and assert
a particular cultural heritage, there have been several arguments sup-
porting the idea of allowing Indians to follow traditional cultural
practices even while in such controlled environments as school or
prison. One of these arguments covers the possible detrimental
effects stemming from regulations that discourage any display of
cultural pride such as wearing a traditional Indian hair style.
In the schools, the effects of policies directed at suppressing and
discouraging Indian culture and tradition have often resulted in
Indian student frustration and alienation, along with a loss of pride,
initiative, and identity.17 This consequence is reported not only as
a personal observation, but as a statistical fact throughout the tran-
scripts of the hearings before the United States Senate Special Sub-
committee on Indian Education, 8 as well as in the report of that
subcommittee.' 9 The findings of the subcommittee illustrate that
the enforcement of such school hair style regulations prohibiting the
wearing of a traditional Indian hair style 0 in effect results in defeat-
ing an often claimed justification for those hair codes. This justifi-
cation, espoused by some school officials and recognized by at least
one court,2' supports enforcement of appearance codes by arguing
that such regulations encourage the state objective of instilling pride
and initiative among students, leading to scholastic achievement.
The results of the hearings point out, however, that instead of
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instilling pride in Indian students, the policies frustrate pride and
discourage motivation.
This detrimental effect is recognized among Indian prison inmates,
and as contributing significantly to at least one Indian inmate's prob-
lems which led to his incarceration,22 as well as being counter-
productive to the rehabilitation goals of modem prisons.23 In light
of these undesirable effects caused by a seemingly innocuous appear-
ance code, a practical problem arises as to developing and enforcing a
hair code that would not harmfully affect any ethnic or racial groups.
A suggested solution to this problem would be either to have no hair
style regulations at all or to develop an "appearance" code that does
not restrict any appearance reflecting a person's ethnic or racial
culture, possibly by providing reasonable exceptions appropriate for
the groups represented in a particular school or prison population.
Recognition of Indian culture is further encouraged in a discussion
of the effect of the current growing interest in cultural patterns and
values of America's past and the relevance it should have to Indian
culture. 4 After noting that the objective of preserving cultural values
in the United States presents the question of whose cultural values,
the authors go on to comment, in reference to a congressional act
dealing with cultural preservation, 25 that "[t]he declaration of Con-
gress that the 'historical and cultural foundations of the nation'
should be preserved in order 'to give a sense of orientation to the
American people' is inclusive. It speaks to and of all Americans-not
only white Americans but... American Indians as well."20
Another cultural argument for allowing Indians to wear traditional
hair styles involves the claim that the first amendment protection for
freedom of speech 27 extends to actions that so specifically convey a
particular message that they can be considered analogous to speech.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,28 the Su-
preme Court recognized that the wearing of black armbands by
students in protest of the Viet Nam War was an expression closely
akin to pure speech and was entitled to first amendment protection.29-
A case even more in point with these Indian rights issues is Braxton
v. Board of Public Instruction," where a Florida court found that
the first amendment protected a black school teacher's right to wear
a beard as "an appropriate expression of his heritage, culture, and
racial pride. 3 1 In accordance with the lines of reasoning in Tinker
and Braxton, the wearing of long braided hair has been claimed to
be a definite expression of pride in being an Indian 32 and, therefore,
is also entitled to protection under the first amendment. The wearing
of a traditional American Indian hair style, viewed as an attempt to
convey a distinct and specific message, can be distinguished from
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other "school hair-length" cases denying the wearing of long hair as
merely a broad symbol of general discontent, rather than as a sign of
a particular communication.33 Thus, the wearing of a traditional hair
style as part of an Indian's cultural heritage and as a clear expression
of that culture can legitimately be argued to be protected under the
first amendment through application of the decisions of Tinker and
Braxton.
The foregoing seems to give support to a view that Native Ameri-
cans should be allowed to wear traditional hair styles. The goal of
institutions such as schools and prisons for the development of self-
worth would be furthered by such tolerance.
However, a contrary view arguing against the recognition of differ-
ent cultures in public schools should be mentioned. That view con-
tends that an integrated school system cannot favor different ethnic
and racial groups and remain one organization.84 While, on its face,
this position may seem to have a logical and practical strength, it
nevertheless seems contrary to the accepted idea that one of the func-
tions of American education is to provide exposure to and exchange of
many different ideas.35 One of the acknowledged conclusions of the
landmark school desegregation case, Brown Y. Board of Education,"0
was that "only by amalgamating children of various races, colors, cul-
tural, ethical, and environmental backgrounds can the public schools
become the effective 'market place of ideas' for the benefit of all
students. 37 As justice Douglas observed in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District,3s "our constitutional system repudiates
the idea that a state may conduct its school 'to foster a homogeneous
people.' ,' Finally, Keyishan v. Board of Regents40 further empha-




There are four reported cases concerning the wearing of a tradi-
tional Indian hair style by an American Indian.42 They deal with
challenges to school or prison dress and hair regulations43 with the
Indians asserting primarily their religious right, and secondarily, their
cultural right to wear a traditional Indian hair style. This tendency
to focus on the religious issue is based on the legal strength of the
first amendment right to free exercise of religion,44 while the cul-
turally based arguments lack such a legal basis. 45 Furthermore, any
legal acknowledgment of cultural customs is usually related to a
religion, and culture itself is not really challenged except in its con-
nection with religious beliefs.46
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Two of the reported cases deal with American Indian students'
hair length and public schools' appearance codes. In New Rider v.
Board of Education,47 three Pawnee Indian junior high school stu-
dents claimed the prerogative of wearing traditional Indian hair styles
in violation of the school's hair code48 as part of their freedom of
religion right,49 as well as part of other rights protected under the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution."
Although substantial evidence was presented on the freedom of
religion right argument,51 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals never
really discussed that issue specifically. The court affirmed the trial
court's reversal of its original holding 2 and found that no substantial
constitutional questions were presented by the students' attack on
the hair regulation.
The appeals court, relying on several other prior holdings,53 went
on to state that the regulation and management of state schools
should be left in the hands of the school authorities and state courts,
and that a federal court should avoid getting involved with the
operations of a state's public school system unless the exercise of a
constitutional right is impinged. The court skirted the religious exer-
cise issue during its argument, negating the free speech issue by citing
as authority an earlier non-Indian student hair-length case, Freeman
v. Flake.4 The court pointed out that it recognized that Freeman
specifically did not concern a claim of any racial or religious dis-
crimination, and that although the New Rider students argued this
distinction, the decision in Freeman would be reaffirmed. This
indicated that although the Freeman holding concerned only the
first amendment right of free speech, the precedent would apply
equally to any other first amendment rights.5 5 In other words, the
decision implied that because it has been held that long hair is not
protected under the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment,
it follows that long hair, even though related to religion and racial
heritage, also is not protected under the freedom of religion clause of
the first amendment. Finally, after balancing the claimed constitu-
tional right and the public interest,56 the court further found that
the hair code involved in this case 57 bore a rational relationship to
the state objective of "instilling pride and initiative among the stu-
dents leading to scholarship attainment and high school spirit and
morale," as well as helping maintain order and discipline in operation
of the school."' As discussed earlier, it is somewhat irrational to be-
lieve that pride and initiative can be instilled in American Indian
students by forbidding the wearing of a traditional Indian hair style
which in fact is claimed to be an expression of pride in their culture
and heritage5 9
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Hatch v. Goerke0 varies from the other cases in that the chal-
lengers of the school's hair regulation"' were the student's parents.
The plaintiffs, the mother being an American Indian, argued gener-
ally that the enforcement of the code infringed on their rights to
rear their children according to their own religious, cultural, and
moral values. In this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals partly
answered the religious freedom question in finding an important dis-
tinction between this case and that of Wisconsin v. Yoder.12 Yoder
allowed Amish parents to withdraw their children from compulsory
public education after a certain grade on the basis that such con-
tinued education created conflicts with the basic religious tenets and
practices of the Amish faith.63 In distinguishing Hatch from Yoder,
the court found that the school appearance regulations in this case
did not create a clash with religious beliefs like the all-encompassing,
religiously based concept of rearing children recognized in Yoder.
However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, as in New Rider,
again avoided addressing the religious freedom question fully by
once more relying on such decisions as Freeman,6 with additional
authority this time of the New Rider decision which reaffirmed
Freeman. Based on those decisions, the federal court abstained
from getting involved in state operations of public schools, leaving
the regulation of student hair length to be handled through state
procedures.65
The other two cases in this area concern the reforcement of prison
hair regulations against inmates. United States ex rel. Goings v.
Aaron66 deals with an Oglala Sioux Indian inmate's right to wear
long hair as part of his religion and culture. However, the decision in
this case deals more with the importance of the inmate's taking of
a "Ceremonial Indian Vow" to be more religious, with the plaintiff
claiming that to force him to cut his hair would break his vow and
subject him to serious consequences. Opposing evidence was pre-
sented as to the beliefs surrounding the severity of breaking such a
vow. 67 The Minnesota District Court decided that since the prisoner
was being released in 55 days from the time of the decision, he could
just renew the vow after his release, but that until his release, he
would be subject to the prison regulations. 8 Thus, the court treated
the issue as moot and chose to enforce the prison regulations in keep-
ing with the majority of cases on prison regulations and constitu-
tional rights.69 Moreover, the court found that the evidence presented
indicated a lack of sincerity in Goings' recently acquired religious
beliefs.7 0 In contrast, the more recent decision of Teterud v. Gillman
found that the Indian inmate's sincerity in his also recently awakened
religious beliefs was not sufficiently contradicted by the evidence and
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the court seemed to apply a more lenient standard.7 Finally, in
balancing the interests in Goings, the court found that even if the
prisoner had had a sincere religious belief, his religious freedom, as
in most cases with non-Indian inmates,72 is subject to reasonable
limitations in the prison environment.73
The most recent case, Teterud v. Gillman,74 discusses and answers
the religious rights question in more depth and more directly75 than
any of the other three cases. Interestingly enough, this case is the only
one that recognizes any rights of an American Indian to wear a tradi-
tional hair style in a case concerning a one-half Cree Indian inmate's
challenge to the enforcement of the Iowa State Penitentiary's hair
regulation against himself and other American Indian inmates.
Under the Supreme Court's definition of religious beliefs followed
in United States v. Seeger,76 the Iowa court here concluded that
Teterud's religious views came within that interpretation and con-
stituted a valid religion worthy of recognition.7 7 Based on evidence
emphasizing various religious and cultural functions that an Indian's
traditional hair style could fulfill,78 the court found that hair plays a
central role in a religion of the Plains Indians79 and that therefore
"[a]n Indian's hair length can have a sufficient religious significance
to make a forced cutting of that hair an encroachment on the Indian's
First Amendment rights." 80 Acknowledging Teterud's sincerity in
his beliefs, the court further held that "if an individual Indian's belief
in the Indian Religion is honest, made in good faith, and sincere, he
should be allowed to wear his hair in the traditional style."'' Unlike
most other prison hair code cases, 82 this decision held that the en-
forcement of the particular prison hair regulations against Teterud
was not justified on the grounds that 'long hair was unsanitary,
created hazards around machinery, increased difficulty in identifying
inmates, or could hide contraband. 81 3 Finally, after reviewing Goings
and New Rider, the court in Teterud specifically disagreed with those
holdings and went on to declare that Teterud's "interest in wearing
the traditional Indian hair style is predicated upon a sincere religious
belief which must be constitutionally protected."8
Religious Aspects
A review of the cases points out that in focusing on the religious
aspects of the four cases, there are similarities as well as distinctions.
The two school-related cases, New Rider and Hatch, basically de-
cided the issue of protection under the first amendment freedom of
religion clause, finding no solid claim of constitutional restraint.88
The decisions in New Rider and Hatch both relied on an earlier
111
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non-Indian student hair-length case that did not involve religious or
racial issues at all, with New Rider implying that freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of religious exercise are essentially the same issue.
As discussed previously, the court in New Rider indicated that
since Freeman had held long hair not to be protected under the
first amendment free speech clause, then long hair was not pro-
tected under the freedom of religion clause either, regardless of any
distinctions. 86
The two prison cases show more distinction in their decisions.
Dealing with the religious issue, Goings found no protection under
the first amendment because the prisoner's newly acquired religious
beliefs were not considered by the court to be sincere. On the other
hand, the Teterud decision held that, based on the evidence, the
inmate's religious beliefs were valid, sincere, and entitled to constitu-
tional protection under the first amendment freedom of religion
clause.
Since Teterud is the only case that recognizes a religious right to
wear a traditional Indian hair style, it is understandable that it varies
in several ways from the other three cases. Teterud is the only deci-
sion that found the hair regulations not to satisfy the claimed
justification. In contrast, Goings found that religious freedom was
subject to reasonable rules of conduct in and out of prison.88 As
discussed supra, New Rider held that the hair code was in keeping
with the state's school objective of instilling pride, encouraging
scholarship and morale, and maintaining discipline.Y9 The Hatch
decision merely found that the regulation did not create a clash
with any significant religious beliefs, and thus should be enforced. 0
Both the plaintiffs in New Rider and the plaintiff in Teterud
presented evidence as to the interrelatedness of religion and the
traditional Indian hair style as well as to other daily activitiesY1 The
court in New Rider hesitated to recognize such an all-encompassing
religion 92 and found the evidence to be insufficient in supporting the
validity of that belief. In Teterud, the court disagreed with New
Rider and found the belief of an interrelation between religion and
the daily aspects of living to be valid, sincere, and worthy of constitu-
tional protection, according to the evidence presented which was
very similar in theory to the evidence offered in New Rider 3
Cultural Aspects
As indicated before, it is difficult to separate the acknowledgment
of culture or the lack of it from religious rights.9 4 Although this is
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true in the four cases dealt with, there are some distinguishable cul-
tural aspects.
Hatch is the only one of the four that specifically includes cultural
values in the alleged rights asserted by the plaintiff parents, and then
it is only generally included in the broad allegations95 with no sub-
stantial argument discussed or answered in the court's decision. In
comparison, the plaintiffs in New Rider did not specifically allege a
cultural right, but a subtle claim was included incidental to the other
issues, particularly the right to religious exercise. 6 Goings dealt with
some cultural aspects in focusing part of the discussion on Goings'
taking of a "Ceremonial Indian Vow" to return to the old Indian
traditions and religion.97 Finally, in contrast to the other cases, the
decision in Teterud seemed to deal more directly with cultural rights
because the court determined one of the issues to be "whether or not
an Indian's cultural and traditional beliefs constitute a religion... ,,"98
but this was again in connection with religion. However, the court
goes beyond the religious point in saying that an Indian may wish to
wear a traditional hair style for a variety of reasons, and it is not the
court's duty to speculate as to the reasons. 99 The court qualifies this
in relation to religious beliefs by stating that as long as an Indian's
belief in an Indian religion is in good faith, honest, and sincere, that
Indian should be allowed to wear a traditional hair style.00 Neverthe-
less, none of these cases seem to clearly recognize any cultural rights
separately from religious rights as justifying an Indian's wearing his
hair in a traditional style.
There does seem to be some legal recognition of a cultural right
that should be acknowledged, at least as argued in the dissent to the
denial of certiorari in New Rider.1 1 That dissent, along with other
sources such as the hearings before the United States Senate Special
Subcommittee on Indian Education'0 2 and the report of that sub-
committee,10 3 recognized the detrimental effect of suppressing Indian
culture 0 4 and, therefore, in addition to other reasons, 05 encouraged
the acknowledgment and allowance of an Indian cultural right to
wear a traditional hair style. However, this was a dissent and only
represents a legal minority. Nevertheless, there was similar evidence
presented and recognized in Teterud'0 6 which indicated at least a
stronger minority opinion which could become that of the majority.
Conclusion
Although the majority of court decisions hold that an Indian has
no constitutionally protected rights to wear a traditional Indian hair
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style as part of a cultural heritage or a religious belief, the holding in
Teterud, plus the dissent opinion in New Rider, indicate the possible
beginnings of a change in attitude. Furthermore, arguments express-
ing the importance of a right to a cultural expression and traditional
identity encourage the recognition of less prohibitive attitudes to-
ward allowing Indians to show pride in their specific cultures and
to freely exercise their traditional religions. Following these modes
of thinking, perhaps Indians in the future will be allowed or even
encouraged to wear traditional hair styles as the exercise of a cultural
and/or religious right.
NOTES
1. In re Grady, 69 Cal. App. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 50 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
2. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 48o F.zd 693 (1oth Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1097, reh. denied, 415 U.S. 939 (1974); Hatch v. Goerke, 5oz F.zd 1189
(Ioth Cir. 1974); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974); United
States ex tel. Goings v. Aaron, 35o F. Supp. 3 (D. Minn. 1972). These cases deal with
the more commonly recognized hair style of land hair parted in the middle with a braid
on each side. However, it should be pointed out that there are many different tradi-
tional hair styles depending on the particular tribe or group of Indians. See, e.g., R.
SPENCER, J. JENNING, ET AL., THE NATIVE AMERICANS (1965) [hereinafter cited as
SPENCER ET AL.]; J. STOUTENBURGH, Jr., DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 136
(196o) [hereinafter cited as STOUTENBURGI]; J. TERRELL, AMERICAN INDIAN AL-
MANAC (1971) [hereinafter cited as TERRELL]; C. WISSLER, INDIANS OF TIE UNITED
STATES (1940) [hereinafter cited as WISSLER].
3" 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (allowed an Indian inmate to wear a tradi-
tional Indian hair style as part of his religious beliefs and culture although in violation
of the prison hair code). For similar non-Indian cases, see Kuyumjian v. Grandway
Dep't Stores, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 5086 (1972) (recognized long hair as a
symbol of the plaintiff's personally developed religion); Braxton v. Board of Public
Instruction, 303 F. Supp 958 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (allowed a black male teacher to
wear a beard as an expression of his culture and racial pride).
4. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 48o F.2d 693 (1oth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1o97, reh. denied, 415 U.S. 939 (1974); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (ioth
Cir. 1974); United States ex tel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972).
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1012 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cupit v. Baton Rouge Police Dep't, 277 So. 2d 454 (C.A. La.
1973) (both of these cases did not allow violation of the hair codes even though the
hair was grown for religious purposes.).
5- U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... .
6. See cases cited in note 2, supra.
7. See, e.g., SPENCER ET AL., STOUTENBURGI, TERRELL, WISSLER, supra note 2.
8. Arapaho, Crees, Oglala Sioux, and Pawnees.
9. This disagreement is illustrated by contrasting evidence presented in several of
the cases concerned. In Teterud, an anthropologist testified to the interrelatedness of
the Plains Indians' religion and daily lives, and pointed out that one of the spiritual
customs of these Indians is to cut off their hair to show grief or humility after a close
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relative has died. Another anthropologist, noting that long braided hair was a tradi-
tional Cree custom, explained the importance of the physical appearance of the Cree
Indians in relation to spiritual matters, stating that the Cree would unbraid their
hair on very serious religious occasions. While in contrast to this, a fullblooded Yankton
Sioux Indian testified that male Indians' hair length was a matter of individual
preference, and noted that her experiences attending many Indian religious ceremonies
across the United States indicated that Indian males do not necessarily wear long hair
in those ceremonies. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
In Goings, the petitioners testified that although the Indian inmates met regularly
to discuss Indian culture and to engage in religious services, he was the only one wearing
long hair. In addition, an Oglala Sioux testified that as a former military pilot, he had
had short hair and that he annually participated in religious ceremonies. United States
ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 35o F. Supp. i (D. Minn. 1972).
In New Rider, an anthropologist testified as to the religious and cultural significance
of long braided hair as well as the frequently reported warrior style of a hair ridge among
the Pawnees. She explained that not only was the hair style traditional, but it was
related to specific Pawnee dance and religious beliefs that everything a Pawnee does
each day has religious significance. While, on the one hand, another anthropologist and
author also testified that the Pawnee culture and religion are highly integrated with
most of the tribal practices and traditions, she went on to say this did not include a
particular custom of wearing long braided hair. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 48o F.2d
693, 697 (ioth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097, reh. denied, 415 U.S. 939
(1974).
1o. This argument was an issue in United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, which con-
cerned the enforcement of the Minnesota State Penitentiary hair code against an Oglala
Sioux Indian inmate. 35o F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972).
11. An Oglala Sioux Indian testified that "a vow of the type petitioner had taken ...
was certain to be important to petitioner, particularly in view of the Indian teachings
that to break a vow of this sort would make him fearful that great misfortune would
be nearly certain to follow." In contrast to this, a Jewish rabbi, aware of the tradition of
long hair in Judaism, testified that a broken vow to cut one's hair could be renewed and
such would in effect amount to a reinstatement. 35o F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Minn. 1972).
12. SPENCER ET AL., STOUTENBURCH, TERRELL, and WISSLER, supra note 2; Dr.
William Bittle, professor of anthropology, University of Oklahoma; Ms. Judy Jordon,
anthropologist specializing in American Indian studies. Dr. Bittle also suggested that
the scalplock, sometimes with an amulet braided into it, which was worn by some
Indians, could be considered religious in a very broad sense, but that hair style was
really tied in with the warrior status and war.
13. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
14. This was included in the petition for writ of certiorari made by the plaintiffs
in New Rider that was denied at 414 U.S. 1097 (1973). Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, on file at the Oklahoma Indian Rights Associa-
tion, Norman, Okla.
15. See, e.g., Despain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist. 428, 384 F.2d
836, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1967).
16. SPENCER ET AL., STOUTENBURrH, TERRELL, WISSLER, supra note z.
17. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, note 14 supra. See also the dissent to the
denial of the petition at 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
18. Hearings Before the Special Senate Subcomm. on Indian Education of the
Senate Comm. on Labor 6 Public Welfare, 9oth Cong. ist and 2d. Sess. (1968). See,
e.g., at Walker, Problems of American Indian Education, at 2oo2, and Patterson,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
De Facto Segregation and the American Indian, at 1657.
19. Senate Special Subcomm. on Indian Education: A National Tragedy, S. REP.
No. 91-501, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969).
2o. The hair regulation concerned in New Rider was that "Hair should have no
odd coloring or style. It should be tapered or blocked in the back and cannot touch the
shirt collar or ears and should be one-fourth inch above the eyebrows; sideburns must
be no lower than the earlobe and face clean shaven . . ." 48o F.zd 693, 695 (1oth
Cir. 1973).
The hair code involved in Hatch included a provision that boys' hair should be kept
trim and neatly groomed and should not extend below the eyebrows or the collar. 502
F.zd 1189, 1191 (loth Cir. 1974).
21. In New Rider, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the testimony
of Marvin Stokes, Superintendent of Schools at Byng, Okla., on the relationship be-
tween compliance with similar school dress-hair regulations and scholarship attainment,
as well as instilling pride and initiative in students and found that "the hair code regula-
tion bears a rational relationship to a state objective, i.e., that of instilling pride and
initiative among the students leading to scholarship attainment and high school spirit
and morale." 48o F.2d 69o, 697 (loth Cir. 1973).
22. In Teterud v. Gillman, the psychiatrist that treated Teterud, the Cree Indian
inmate, described him "when he first came for treatment as having a passive-aggressive
personality which was based in part upon childhood rejection, including feeling of
being 'unworthy as an Indian' and being 'just another God-damn Indian Kid.'"
Furthermore, in accordance with the view that an Indian should be allowed to recognize
his culture rather than perpetuating policies of suppression, "Dr. Johnson advised
Teterud that his low opinion of himself could change and that he should 'start taking
pride in being a red man, or an Indian, as opposed to feeling bad about it.' " 385 F.
Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
23. In Teterud, "Dr. Johnson further testified that the compelled cutting of
Teterud's hair would generally be counter-productive to rehabilitation and, therefore,
that the cutting of Teterud's hair would have no beneficial effect." Other testimony in
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& Zingg].
25. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 36 U.S.C.A. § 470 (1970) as cited
in Wilson & Zingg, supra note 24, at 413.
26. Id. at 415.
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech .... "
28. 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
29. It is important to point out that this was the holding in Tinker where at least
there was no finding that the operation of the school was substantially endangered by
the symbolic speech.
30. 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
31. Id. at 9 59 -
32. See, eg., New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.zd 693 (loth Cir. 1973).
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33. Freedman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (loth Cir. 1971). For such a distinction see,
e.g., the dissent to New Rider v. Board of Educ., where cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097
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34. 48o F.2d 693, 698 (1oth Cir. 1973).
35. See, eg.,Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)-
37. 48o F.2d 693, 699 (1oth Cir. 1973). It is interesting to note that this summary
of the Brown conclusion is cited in the very case that the argument against favoring
different ethnic and racial groups is raised, although not in relation to each other.
38. 393 U.S. 503 (1968). See also discussion on Tinker in Folsom, Equal Oppor-
tunity for Indian Children-the Legal Basis for Compelling Bilingual and Bicultural
Education, 3 Ams. INDIAN L. REv., 51, 71-72 (1975).
39. 414 U.S. 1097, 1098 (1974).
40. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
41. "'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American Schools.' Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U.S. 479] at
487 [81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.zd 2313. The classroom is peculiarly the 'market-place of
ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
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D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ." 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
42. Cited at note 2, supra, and the subjects of this note.
43. The hair regulation concerned in New Rider was that "[h]air should have no
odd coloring or style. It should be tapered or blocked in the back and cannot touch the
shirt collar or ears and should be one-fourth inch above the eyebrows; sideburns must
be no lower than the earlobe and face clean shaven. 48o F.2d 693, 695 (loth
Cir. 1973).
The hair code in Hatch included a provision that boys' hair should be kept trim
and neatly groomed and should not extend below the eyebrows or the collar. 502
F.2d 1189, 1191 (loth Cir. 1974).
The hair code concerned in Goings was "....[h]air cuts must be in accordance
with the following guidelines: Hair must not extend over the ears on the sides, over the
collar in the back, over the eyebrows in the front. .. " 35o F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Minn.
1972).
The hair code in Teterud was "hair length may grow at the shirt collar, and bottom
on the ears. May grow over the ears if desired." 385 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D. Iowa
1974).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. However, it could be broadly argued that under the fourteenth amendment,
a freedom or liberty to follow a traditional culture cannot be deprived without
due process of law and that as part of the equal protection of the law, an Indian has
just much right to follow his cultural beliefs as do other Americans of the more
recognized Judeo-Christian religions and cultures:
"... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
46. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Shaffield v. Northrop
Worldwide Aircraft Sew., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (Ala. 1974); In re Grady, 6i Cal.
App. 2d 88, 394 P.2d 728, 50 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
47- 4 8o F.2d 693 (loth Cir. 1973).
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48. New Rider hair code, see note 43 supra.
49. U.S. CONST. amend I.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech. . ."; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
51. See arguments note 9 supra.
52. The trial court originally found in issuing a preliminary injunction, that the
wearing of long braided hair is an expression of Pawnee Indian tradition and heritage
as well as a symbol of their religious identity. 48o F.zd 693, 696 (loth Cir. 1973).
53- San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (loth Cir. 1971 ).
54. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (loth Cir. 1971).
55- 480 F.2d 693, 698 (loth Cir. 1973).
56. For authority to apply balancing test, see the following cases: Barker v. Wingo,
Warden, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Christian
Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 47o F.zd 849 (loth Cir. 1972).
57- See discussion at note zo, supra.
58. See discussion at note 21, supra. The superintendent also explained that better
groomed students generally created less trouble and that a dress-hair code that
recognized each ethnic group would create a disruptive atmosphere.
59. See notes 17 through 23 supra and accompanying text.
6o. 502 F.2d 1189 (loth Cir. 1974).
63. For an explanation of the hair code, see note 20 supra.
62. 4o6 U.S. 205 (197z).
63. Id.
64. The court in this decision found that the duty of supervising a student's hair
length was for the state and should be handled through state procedures. 448 F.zd 258
(loth Cir. 1971).
65. 502 F.zd 1189, 1192 (loth Cir. 1974).
66. 35o F. Supp i (D. Minn. 1972).
67. See note 3.1 supra.
68. 35o F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Minn. 1972). The hair code concerned was "... [h]air
cuts must be in accordance with the following guidelines: Hair must not extend over
the ears on the sides, over the collar in the back, over the eyebrows in the front..
Id. at 2.
69. See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 ( 3d Cir. 1968); Evans v. Ciccone, 377
F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967); Poe v. Werner, 336 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Holt v.
Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Barnett v. Rodgers, 41o F.2d 995
(C.A.D.C. 1969).
70. 35o F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Minn. 1972): "A prime consideration in the case
obviously is whether the petitioner is sincere in pressing his claim on the grounds of
his religious beliefs insofar as regards long hair, and on this issue the court is constrained
to find that there is substantial doubt and to hold against petitioner. According to his
testimony, he had gone 26 / years of his life without following Indian customs, the
last ten of which he has spent in confinement. No other Indians at the Institution are
motivated by religious customs the way he claims to be.... Further, he did submit to
the cutting of his hair after his furlough .... Nevertheless, the court cannot believe
that in such a short period of time the petitioner has become so devoutly religious
in his own tribal ways that he cannot forego growing his hair to the desired length for
another brief period."
71. 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa 1974): "It suffices to say that if an individual
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Indian's belief in the Indian religion is honest, made in good faith, and sincere, he
should be allowed to wear his hair in the traditional style....
"..Warden Brewer... seems to indicate that Teterud was sincere in his beliefs.
On the other hand, the Court must note that Teterud was raised a Catholic in an
orphanage during his youth. The record further discloses that it was not until adulthood
that Teterud became interested in his Indian ancestry and heritage. In addition, prior
to trial Teterud was an active member of the Church of the New Song, a religious
organization which this court recognized as such .... The thrust of the defendants'
challenge of Teterud's sincerity stems from the fact that the plaintiffs' reawakened
interest in Indian customs and life appears to be of very recent vintage. This challenge
must be viewed, however, in light of the additional fact that Teterud has spent the
bulk of his life in various institutions wherein his active desire to pursue the Indian
way of life may have been somewhat constrained. The Court can never know with
assurance whether Teterud is sincere or insincere. The defendants, however, have not
presented sufficient evidence to show that Teterud's beliefs are not made in good
faith."
72. See cases at note 69 supra.
73. 350 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Minn. 1972).
74. 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
75. Id. at 154: "Hair length may grow to the shirt collar, and bottom on the ears.
May grow over the ears if desired."
76. Id. at 3-53: "In United States v. Seeger,... 380 U.S. [163] at 176, 85 S.Ct.
[85o] at 859, [13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965)], the Supreme Court interpreted religious beliefs
as follows: "Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent."
77. Id. at 156: "The Indians' beliefs are based upon the existence of a Great Spirit,
a power or being greater than man and, thus definition."
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 157. It should be noted that the decision is not limited only to Cree
Indians, but is extended to include Plains Indians generally.
8o. Id. at 156.
81. Id.
82. See cases at note 69 supra.
83. 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
84. Id.
85. 502 F.2d 1189, 1192 (Loth Cir. 1974); 480 F.2d 693, 698 (1oth Cir. 1973).
86. 480 F.2d 693, 698 (ioth Cir. 1973).
87. The justification was based on the grounds "that long hair was unsanitary,
created hazards around machinery, increased difficulty in identifying inmates or could
hide contraband." 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
88. 350 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Minn. 1972).
89. See discussion at notes 21 and 56 supra.
90. 502 F.2d 1189, 1192 (:oth Cir. 1974).
91. See discussion at note 9 supra.
92. 480 F.2d 693, 700 (roth Cir. 1973): "We believe that we would create a
veritable quagmire for school boards ... were we to hold that the subject dress-hair
regulation implicates basic constitutional values. We need only ponder ...what
exceptions beyond those urged here might be constitutionally mandated upon the
appellees should the appellants prevail here.... [W]e might ask how a school board
could draft a dress-hair regulation... which would not impinge upon or interfere with
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a personal held belief that is sincere and meaningful in the life of its possessor (a
student), parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God."
93- See discussion of evidence presented at note 9 supra.
94- See, e.g., 406 U.S. 205 (197z); 373 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Ala. 1974); 394 P.2d
728 (Cal. 1964).
95. The parents claimed the enforcement of the hair regulation violated their right
to raise their children according to their own religious, cultural, and moral values.
5oz F.zd 1189, 1191-92 (loth Cir. 1974).
96. Sidney Moore, Sr., age 69, testified that "[w]hen he was a boy he wore long
braided hair .... He referred to such hair style as the 'old traditional ways.' He sees
a resurgence among the young Indian people to 'regain their tradition, to learn their
culture.' " 480 F.2d 693, 696 (ioth Cir. 1973). See also note 9 supra.
97- 350 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Minn. 1972)
98. 385 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
99. Id.
1oo. Id.
101. 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
102. See note 8 supra.
103. See note 19 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 17 through 23 supra.
L05. "Petitioners were not wearing their hair in a desired style simply because it
was the fashionable or accepted style, or because they somehow felt the need to register
an inchoate discontent with the general malaise they might have perceived in our
society. They were in fact attempting to broadcast a clear and specific message to their
fellow students and others-their pride in being Indian. This, I believe, should clearly
bring this case within the ambit of Tinker... where we struck down a school policy
which refused to allow students to wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War. We recognized that such armbands were closely akin to pure speech and were
entitled to First Amendment protection .... at least where, as here ... there was no
finding that the operation of the school was substantially endangered by the symbolic
speech ... " 414 U.S. 1097, 1098 (1973).
1o6. See discussion at notes 22 and 23 supra; 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa
1974)-
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